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I. INTRODUCTION
Assume it is Saturday morning, and you wake up and check your
cell phone. You text your friend on your walk to brunch, and post a
photo of your waffle on Instagram while there. Afterwards, you
call your family as you drive to the pharmacy, where you check your
* Samantha G. Zimmer is a 2018 J.D. candidate at Duquesne University School of Law.
She graduated from the Pennsylvania State University in 2015 with B.A. degrees in Com-
parative Literature and Telecommunications with highest honors.
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email while you are in line. All in these few hours, your phone has
connected to cell towers' close to you as you move, even crossing
into cells created by different towers as you travel. Each time you
begin one of these activities, you connect to your cell phone carrier's
network.
The average cell phone user connects to the cell phone carrier's
network countless times a day, whether the user is cognizant of it
or not.2 When calls are placed, text messages are sent, or pictures
are posted to social media, the phone connects to the network via a
nearby cell tower.3 When this happens, information relating to this
network connection is collected by cell phone carriers as part of rou-
tine business practices.4 This information that is generated and
recorded by the carriers ("Cell Site Location Information" or "CSLI")
contains not only an approximation of the location of the phone, but
also information about date and time of calls, duration of calls, and
to whom calls are placed.5 CSLI is highly prolific, as is evidenced
by Timothy Carpenter, whose case is about to come before the Su-
preme Court. Carpenter connected to his carrier's network so many
times over the course of 127 days that it created 12,898 data points
regarding his cell site location.6 Under the current law, law enforce-
ment officers were able to obtain this significant amount of sensi-
tive information without probable cause.7
Timothy Carpenter's case is not unusual. As the presence of tech-
nology increases rapidly, personal information about sers becomes
less private.8 But in a world where technology changes almost daily
and laws remain stagnant for decades, courts and legislatures are
tasked with finding the delicate balance between outdated laws,
1. Cell phone towers are pole-like structures that rise hundreds of feet tall. Marshall
Brian et al., How Cell Phones Work, Cell-phone Towers, HOW STUFF WORKS (Nov. 14, 2000),
http:/electronics.howstuffworks.com/cell-phone 13.htm.
2. See Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellants, United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 990 (6th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-1572) (noting
that cell phones regularly connect to the network and continue to do so more frequently, as
phones are checking for new emails and other data).
3. Steven M. Harkins, CSLI Disclosure: Why Probable Cause is Necessary to Protect
What's Left of the Fourth Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1875, 1882 (2011).
4. Patrick E. Corbett, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Site Location Information: What
should we do while we wait for the Supremes?, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 215, 217 (2015).
5. Id.
6. In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d
1011, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
7. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2016).
8. Kathleen Mitchell Reitmayer, Emerging Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 1
SABER AND SCROLL 99, 99 (2012), http://digitalcommons.apus.edu/cgiviewcontent.cgi? arti-
cle=1022&eontext=sberndseroll.
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technological advancement, and personal liberties.9 The Fourth
AmendmentIO has become the center of this balancing act, as the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is ana-
lyzed in this new light." With the advancement of technology lead-
ing to the proliferation of cell phones,12 many law enforcement agen-
cies seek CSLI when gathering evidence in a criminal investiga-
tion.13 Warrantless acquisition of CSLI by law enforcement officers
from cell phone carriers presents one example of the increasing ten-
sion between government interests and individual privacy in the
technological age.14
CSLI searches hang in the balance of this tension with courts
coming to different conclusions about the amount of protection
CSLI should receive under the Fourth Amendment. Some courts
have relied upon the third-party doctrine, finding that individuals
lose a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI since it is volun-
tarily conveyed to the carrier.15 Some courts have rejected the
third-party doctrine, alternatively finding that this information is
9. Laurie Buchan Serafino, "I know my rights, so you go'n need a warrant for that": The
Fourth Amendment, Riley's Impact, and Warrantless Searches of Third Party Clouds, 19
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 154, 156 (2014).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Specifically, the Fourth Amendment states that:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
11. Reitmayer, supra note 8, at 99.
12. See Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/industry-data/ctia-
annual-wireless-industry-survey (last visited Jan. 13, 2017). In a recent survey of cell phone
usage, it was found that there were 377.9 million wireless subscriber connections. Id. Addi-
tionally, the wireless penetration rate (the number of active wireless units divided by the
total United States population) was 115.7%. Id.
13. See Transparency Report, AT&T, http://about.att.com/content/csr/home/ frequently-
requested info/governance/transparencyreport. html (last visited Jan. 12, 2017) (reporting
receiving 16,077 general court orders for historic and real-time CSLI data from January to
June 2016 alone).
14. See, e.g., Jenima Kiss, Does Technology Pose a Threat to our Private Life?, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2010, 7:07 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/aug/21/
facebook-places-google (recognizing the emergence of privacy issues in the context of technol-
ogy, particularly social media location services); Abigail Tracy, While the Supreme Court Hes-
itates on Warrantless Cell Location Data Collection, Your Privacy Remains at Risk, FORBES
(Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/abigailtracy/2015/10/16/while-the-supreme-
court-hesitates-on-warrantless-cell-location-data-collection-your-privacy-remains-at-
risk/#7e6906893056 (acknowledging that the issue of CSLI could have "broad implications
for the future of digital privacy").
15. See generally United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015). The third-party
doctrine establishes that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in "infor-




not conveyed voluntarily.16 As a result, those courts have held that
gathering CSLI is a Fourth Amendment search, because users have
a reasonable expectation of privacy.1 7 Still other courts have
avoided the third-party doctrine in relation to location data, favor-
ing instead an analysis of the prolonged search on the whole under
what is termed as the mosaic theory.1 8
Courts will remain divided on the issue of CSLI until some action
is taken by both the Supreme Court and Congress to clarify this
ambiguous area with its varied doctrines and precedent. Under
current law, there are no sufficient solutions. The established
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is insufficient to cover the
unique nature of CSLI. Additionally, the third-party doctrine is im-
practical applied to modern technologies, and the mosaic theory
poses more questions than answers. The recent split in circuit
courts of appeal on this issue demonstrates that the courts alone
are not the proper vehicle through which to increase CSLI search
and seizure protection. The Supreme Court is now posed to finally
take on the issue on appeal in United States v. Carpenter, but the
solution cannot begin and end there.19 In order to ensure Fourth
Amendment protection for CSLI, the Supreme Court should limit
continued application of the third-party doctrine in the technologi-
cal context, specifically as applied to CSLI, as third-parties are in-
escapable in modern communications. Additionally, Congress
should enact a comprehensive statute codifying the requirement of
a warrant based on probable cause prior to the government's acqui-
sition of any CSLI.
II. CSLI AND THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
When cell phones are turned on, they connect to network cell tow-
ers via specifically assigned network and cell phone identification
16. See, e.g., United States v. Graham (Graham 1), 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated,
824 F.3d 421 (Graham 11) (4th Cir. 2016); In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for a Crim-
inal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1031, 1033, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
17. In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d
at 1036.
18. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 560-61 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The mosaic
theory analyzes searches "as a collective sequence of steps rather than as individual steps."
Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311,312 (2012).
Under this theory, collective police actions can constitute a Fourth Amendment search even
though each action in isolation may not. Id.
19. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W.
3567 (U.S. June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402).
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numbers.20 Depending on the location of the phone among the tow-
ers, the network then decides though which tower to route the call.2 1
The cell phone continues to send information about the location of
the phone in relation to the tower periodically to the carrier while
the phone is turned on and connecting to the network.22 When the
phone is in an area with more towers, the location of the phone can
be more precisely pinpointed.23 CSLI can be either historical, mean-
ing law enforcement receives the records after the fact, or real-time,
where law enforcement can track the suspect's location movement
as it is occurring.24 For the purposes of this article, CSLI will refer
to both real time and historical.25
Law enforcement can obtain a suspect's CSLI under the proce-
dures set forth in the Stored Communications Act ("SCA"). 26 Passed
over twenty years ago, the SCA is tailored to an older era of tech-
nology and focuses on the distinction between content and non-con-
tent2 7 when determining what level of protection certain infor-
mation receives.28 Specifically, under the SCA, there are certain
requirements for obtaining "contents of a wire or electronic commu-
nication"29 that differ from non-content.30 Non-content is consid-
ered "a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber or to
a customer of such service (not including the content of communi-
cations)."31 For non-content information under the SCA, the gov-
ernment can require a "provider of electronic communication ser-
vice . . . to disclose a record" after a law enforcement officer obtains
a court order.32 The request for the order does not require probable
cause, but rather just "specific and articulable facts showing that
20. Brian et al., supra note 1. Cell Phones have various codes associated with them for
network verification. Id. When the cell phone is turned on, the network verifies the user
through a system identification code unique to the carrier, as well as an electronic serial
number unique to the individual phone. Id.
21. Harkins, supra note 3, at 1882.
22. Id. at 1881-82.
23. Id. at 1883.
24. Corbett, supra note 4, at 217.
25. For this article, the distinction between real-time and historical CSLI does not factor
into the argument or analysis for increased Fourth Amendment protection. Rather, it is
argued that all CSLI should be given full protection under the Fourth Amendment regardless
of whether it is collected by a third party or the government.
26. See generally 18 U.S.C.A §§ 2701-2712 (West 2016).
27. Id. § 2703(a).
28. Corbett, supra note 4, at 218.
29. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(a) (West 2016).
30. Id. § 2703(b).
31. Id. § 2703(c).
32. Id.
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there are reasonable grounds to believe [the records] are relevant
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation."33
The SCA requires that the records provided pursuant to the Act
contain various types of information, including the length of call
and service.34 However, the SCA does not specify location infor-
mation as something that must be on the disclosed records.35 De-
spite the fact that the SCA is silent with regards to location infor-
mation, CSLI has been classified by law enforcement and courts as
non-content information that falls under the less strict proof stand-
ard of the SCA. 3 6 It is this standard of less than probable cause that
has been at the center of appeals focused upon greater Fourth
Amendment protection for CSLI. 3 7
1II. PATCHWORK OF PRECEDENT
The SCA is the statutory provision law enforcement utilizes to
obtain CSLI. However, because the SCA does not specifically con-
template this type of information, litigants are raising the issue of
whether CSLI collection is a Fourth Amendment search. A recent
movement in courts acknowledges the need for increased protection
of the copious information mined from technology.38 Yet, the con-
trolling precedent still focuses on specific or outdated technology in
limited circumstances.3 9
33. Id. § 2703(d). Under the provisions of the SCA regarding content of communications,
the government may only compel disclosure of content of communications after obtaining a
warrant based on probable cause or with prior notice to the subscriber and an administrative
subpoena or court order. Id. § 2703(b).
34. Id. § 2703(c)(2).
35. Id. The SCA enumerates that the record holder shall disclose the: name; address;
local and long distance telephone connection records, or records of session times and dura-
tions; length of service (including start date) and types of service utilized; telephone or in-
strument number or other subscriber number or identity . . . and means and sources of pay-
ment for such service (including any credit card or bank account number), of a subscriber to
or customer of such service. Id.
36. Id. § 2703(d).
37. See generally Graham I, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Carpenter,
819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2015).
38. Compare Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (acknowledging cell phones
collect distinct, revealing information that warrants greater protection), with United States
v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 886 (6th Cir. 2015) (comparing CSLI to information found on the
outside of a mailing, which is not constitutionally protected).
39. See generally United States v. Wheeler, 169 F. Supp. 3d 896 (E.D. Wis. 2016) (provid-
ing an expansive summary of Supreme Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the con-
text of CSLI).
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A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and the Third-Party Doc-
trine
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of what, if
any, Fourth Amendment protection is awarded to CSLI. Therefore,
the Court's established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is the
only guidance for lower courts facing this issue.4 0 Although tres-
pass principals defined early Fourth Amendment analyses, the
modern Fourth Amendment construction is largely premised on the
concept that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places."4 1
As such, the Fourth Amendment analysis focuses on whether an
individual has both a subjectively and objectively reasonable expec-
tation of privacy that is violated by a particular search.4 2 This anal-
ysis, termed the Katz test, is two-pronged.4 3 First, courts determine
whether an individual has an actual expectation of privacy.44 Sec-
ond, if the individual does have an actual expectation of privacy,
courts determine whether that expectation is "one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'4 5
The Supreme Court first looked to Fourth Amendment reasona-
ble expectations of privacy in relation to telecommunications in
1979 in Smith v. Maryland, where it brought the established third-
party doctrine into an age of technology.46 In Smith, the police,
without a warrant, installed a pen register4 7 on a telephone com-
pany's equipment to record the phone numbers dialed from the de-
fendant's landline phone.48 The Court held that there was no rea-
sonable subjective xpectation of privacy for telephone users when
it came to numbers dialed on the phone.4 9 This was because such
information must be conveyed to the telephone company, a third
party, as part of the transaction.50 Further, even if the defendant
40. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (discussing current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to include the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy, and Knotts
and Kyllo holdings).
41. Katz v. United States, 399 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); See also Jones, 132 S. Ct. 949 (em-
phasizing that the history of the Fourth Amendment is closely connected to the principles of
property and trespass).




46. See generally Smith, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
47. The pen register was not a listening device for wiretapping purposes, but instead
recorded the telephone numbers dialed from a suspect's home phone. Id. at 737.
48. Id.




did have a subjective expectation of privacy, there was no reasona-
ble objective expectation that this information would be private.5 1
In noting this, the Court harkened back to the established third-
party doctrine, whereby an individual does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily given to third par-
ties.52 Thus, since the defendant "voluntarily conveyed to [the
phone company] information that it had facilities for recording and
that it was free to record . . . [the defendant] assumed the risk that
the information would be divulged to police."53
Many of the twenty-first century concerns about the third-party
doctrine, including assumption of the risk and lack of technology
alternatives, were present when Smith was decided.54 Justice Mar-
shall dissented from the majority in Smith, presenting some of the
first arguments as to the possible shortcomings of the third-party
doctrine when applied to technology.5 5 Marshall was skeptical of
the majority's assumption that individuals are generally aware that
the information they convey to phone companies is recorded and
compiled as part of business records.5 6 Additionally, Marshall ar-
gued against the majority's reliance upon the consumer's assump-
tion of the risk of disclosure under the third-party doctrine.5 7 He
advocated that it was unfair to claim assumption of the risk when
there was no practical alternative to using the phone.5 8 The only
alternative to avoid this possible disclosure was to "forgo use of
what for many has become a personal or professional necessity."59
Marshall argued instead that the test for a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy under Katz should be dependent on the risks an in-
dividual "should be forced to assume in a free and open society."6 0
Thus, Marshall would have held that there is a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in phone numbers dialed, and that law enforcement
51. Id. at 743-44.
52. Id. at 743-44; see, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (noting that
in terms of banking information, "the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party"); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973)
(finding there to be no expectation of privacy in records given to an accountant).
53. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.
54. See generally id. at 749-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 748-49. As will be discussed later, Justice Stewart dissented separately from
the Smith majority, presenting the first sentiments that would come to resemble the mosaic
theory. Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. Id.





officers should be required to obtain warrants prior to asking a tel-
ephone company to disclose such information.61 Nevertheless, de-
spite the concerns voiced by Justice Marshall, the third-party doc-
trine prevails and constitutes the primary standard under which
courts determine that technological information does not have full
Fourth Amendment protection.62
B. The Mosaic Theory and Location Tracking Devices
As Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has developed along with
technological advancements, the mosaic theory has emerged as a
possible replacement to the third-party doctrine.63 While some-
thing similar to the mosaic theory appeared in Justice Stewart's
dissenting opinion in Smith v. Maryland,64 the modern mosaic the-
ory is largely credited to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals in the case of United States v. Maynard.65 In Maynard, the
police attached a GPS tracking device to the defendant's jeep with-
out a warrant and tracked his movements with the device for ap-
proximately a month.66 The Circuit Court found the Maynard case
to present an issue typically left unanswered by past precedent:
"whether 'wholesale' or 'mass' surveillance of an individual requires
a warrant."67 After finding that the attachment of a GPS tracking
device did constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, the
court applied Katz and found the defendant had a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the whole of his movements.68
The court used Smith to support this interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, noting that the Smith Court's analysis was focused
not only on a reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers di-
aled, but also on a reasonable expectation that the numbers dialed
would be compiled in a list.69 As a result, the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy was composed of "parts" (the numbers dialed) that
make up the "whole" (the compiled list of the numbers dialed).70
61. Id. at 752.
62. Serafino, supra note 9, at 168.
63. Kerr, supra note 18, at 313.
64. Smith, 442 U.S. 735, 748 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting the information from
the pen register should be protected not because it could be incriminating, but because the
information taken together shows the people and places called, thus revealing "the most in-
timate details of a person's life").
65. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom., United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
66. Id. at 555.
67. Id. at 558.
68. Id. at 560.




The D.C. Circuit Court then reasoned that the privacy interest in
the whole could be greater than the privacy interests in the parts.71
The concept of the mosaic theory by the Maynard court suggests
that the prolonged search of an individual's location compiled on
the whole reveals a more detailed picture of a person's life than one
piece of tracking information alone.72 Consequently, there is an ob-
jectively reasonable expectation of privacy in society for such a
search.73 For example, the court notes that while location data
showing a visit to the gynecologist is not particularly revealing on
its own, that snippet of location information coupled with data in-
dicating another location to be a trip to a baby supply store is indeed
revealing.74
On appeal, in the consolidated case United States v. Jones, the
Supreme Court affirmed the D.C. Circuit Court, finding that the
GPS tracking did constitute a search of a protected area under the
Fourth Amendment.75 However, the Court declined to apply the
Katz reasonableness analysis or the D.C. Circuit's mosaic theory,
and applied traditional trespass principles instead.76 The Court
noted that Katz did not "narrow the Fourth Amendment's scope,
thus, the traditional property and trespass principles of the Fourth
Amendment remained and were sufficient to settle the dispute in
this case.77 As a result, the warrantless attachment of the GPS to
the car was an intrusion on a constitutionally protected area that
violated the Fourth Amendment.78
The Jones opinion is perhaps most interesting in the evolving
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because of the concurring opin-
ions presented.79 Although the Court chose not to give weight to
the mosaic theory analysis utilized by the D.C. Circuit, Justice So-
tomayor expressed some support for the theory in her concurrence,
as technological advances make non-trespassory surveillances more
common.80 Sotomayor noted that "in cases involving even short-
term monitoring, some unique attributes of GPS surveillance rele-
vant to the Katz analysis will require particular attention."81 In her
71. Id.
72. Id. at 562.
73. Id. at 563.
74. Id. at 562.
75. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012).
76. Id. at 951.
77. Id. Specifically, the Court stated that "Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ... [is] tied
to common-law trespass." Id. at 947.
78. Id. at 951.
79. See generally id. at 954.




view, GPS tracking provides a widespread and detailed record of an
individual's movements, thus reflecting details about "political, pro-
fessional, religious, and sexual associations. "82
Sotomayor argued that for future analyses courts should focus on
whether an individual reasonably expects his or her movements to
be recorded and gathered in a way that allows the government to
discover personal details from the aggregate of the GPS tracking.83
Most notably, Sotomayor concluded her concurrence by indicating
the need to reconsider the third-party doctrine, as it is particularly
unworkable in the current digital era, where large quantities of in-
dividual information are shared even in the most uninteresting
transactions.84 Although not adopted by the Supreme Court, the
mosaic theory has gained some traction in certain courts, while oth-
ers have deferred on the issue.85
Two Supreme Court decisions predating Jones and focusing on a
more rudimentary form of location tracking, the beeper,86 fre-
quently enter the CSLI discussion.87 In United States v. Knotts, law
enforcement officers installed a beeper inside a container the de-
fendant was transporting.88 Law enforcement then used the infor-
mation generated from the beeper to create probable cause for a
search warrant.89 The Court held that the defendant had no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in his movement on public roads as
it was tracked by the beeper.90 In United States v. Karo, law en-
forcement officers obtained a court order to install a beeper on a can
of ether the defendant would be carrying.91 There, the Court found
82. Id.
83. Id. at 956.
84. Id. at 957.
85. Compare United States v. White, 62 F. Supp. 3d 614, 623 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (citing to
Justice Sotomayor's concurring opinion in Jones to find there was a violation of a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the month-long tracking of a defendant's cell phone location), with
United States v. Ashburn, 76 F. Supp. 3d 401, 414 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (declining to decide ad-
missibility of long-term location tracking information under the mosaic theory, but utilizing
a good faith exception instead).
86. Beepers are "battery-powered radio transmitter[s] that emit recurrent signals at a
set frequency." Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE
L.J. 1461, 1461 (1977). When the beepers are attached to an object, the location of the beeper
and object can be monitored for extended periods of time via a receiver to which the beeper
transmits signals. Id.
87. See generally United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276 (2001).
88. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
89. Id. at 279.
90. Id. at 285.
91. Karo, 468 U.S. at 708.
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the government's monitoring or location tracking of the beeper con-
stituted a search because it tracked the defendant while he was in
his home.92
Both Knotts and Karo clarify where there is a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in terms of location tracking. More importantly,
however, they also necessarily implicate the distinction between
GPS tracking implemented by the government and location infor-
mation collected by a third party and later obtained by the govern-
ment.93 As such, they are often cited to or distinguished in cases
involving CSLI as an important part of Supreme Court precedent
shaping these decisions.94 Both of the beeper cases demonstrate the
Court's willingness to protect an individual's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in her location, so long as the government is the en-
tity carrying out the activity.95
Recently, the Supreme Court again showed a willingness to pro-
tect individual privacy in the face of government intrusion.96 In Ri-
ley v. California, the Court expanded Fourth Amendment protec-
tion to cell phones in specific circumstances.9 7 While the Court in
Riley was concerned only with searches of cell phone contents in
searches incident to arrest, much of the Court's reasoning extended
some of the principles of the mosaic theory to cell phone technol-
ogy. 9 8 Specifically, the Court noted that the information contained
in a cell phone reveals significant personal details when viewed
comprehensively, and that "the sum of an individual's private life
can be reconstructed" through the various pictures, locations, and
information stored on the phone.99 Interestingly, the Court refer-
enced Jones and acknowledged that "[h]istoric location information
is a standard feature of many smart phones and can reconstruct
someone's specific movements down to the minute."10 0
92. Id. at 714.
93. See In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data (In re Application Fifth
Circuit), 724 F.3d 600, 609 (5th Cir. 2013). The Fifth Circuit distinguished Karo from Smith
on the basis that in Karo, "the Government was the one collecting and recording the infor-
mation." Id. The court also stated that for Fourth Amendment intrusions, the finding of a
search is dependent on whether the government or a third party collects the information. Id.
at 610.
94. See, e.g., Graham I, 796 F.3d 332, 347 (4th Cir. 2015) (distinguishing CSLI from the
beepers in Karo, as CSLI can reveal more information); United States v. Wheeler, 169 F.
Supp. 3d 896, 903 (E.D. Wis. 2016) (summarizing the Karo holding as important Supreme
Court precedent when deciding on a CSLI Fourth Amendment search).
95. In re Application Fifth Circuit, 724 F.3d at 610.
96. See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
97. Id. at 2485.
98. See generally id. at 2489.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2490.
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Ultimately, the Court held that police were required to obtain a
warrant before searching cell phones seized on suspects; specifically
noting that the personal information accumulated from technology
does not lose its right to Fourth Amendment protection simply be-
cause individuals carry such information with them.101 This varied
precedent indicates a trend by the Supreme Court towards recog-
nizing that technology challenges traditional Fourth Amendment
application and that there is a need to adequately protect location
information under these changing circumstances. Despite his
trend, the precedent above does not apply specifically to CSLI, so
the third-party doctrine still controls CSLI cases decided by lower
courts.
IV. CIRCUIT SPLIT AND REALIGNMENT
Since the Supreme Court has failed to address where CSLI falls
within the evolving precedent of the third-party doctrine and the
mosaic theory, circuit courts of appeals have been without guidance
when facing this issue. During 2015 alone, three federal circuits
ruled differently on the Fourth Amendment protection of CSLI with
varying rationales.102 The circuit split seemed to resolve in 2016
with the circuits agreeing again, at least for now.103 However, the
previous circuit split and recent realignment provide insight into
how courts are grappling with CSLI and show that they are still in
need of resolution from a higher authority.10 4
101. Id. at 2495.
102. Compare United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 887 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding the
collection of CSLI was not a search under the Fourth Amendment, focusing on CSLI as non-
content used for business purposes), and United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 507 (11th Cir.
2015) (applying the third-party doctrine and holding that the government's acquisition of
CSLI was not a Fourth Amendment search), with Graham I, 796 F.3d 332, 361 (4th Cir. 2015)
(declining to apply the third-party doctrine and holding that there is a reasonable expectation
of privacy in CSLI).
103. Does Seeking Cell Site Location Information Require a Search Warrant?, COLUMBIA
LAW CAPI (Aug. 2009), http://web.law.columbia.edulsites/default/files/microsites/public-in-
tegrity/files/does _seeking-cel 1site location information-require a_search warrant -
wesley-cheng_ _august2016update - 0 .pdf. Following Graham II, the circuit courts of ap-
peals may now be in agreement hat CSLI does not warrant Fourth Amendment protection.
Id. However, most other circuits have still not ruled on this issue, and while district courts
have mostly conformed, some have not. Id.
104. Robinson Meyer, No One Will Save You from Cellphone Tracking, THE ATLANTIC
(June 2, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/20 16/06/fourth-circuit-csli-
cellphone-location-tracking-legal/485225/. As noted by Orin Kerr, it will likely not be long
before the Supreme Court rules on the CSLI issue, as all it would take is at least one juris-
diction to go against the grain by providing Fourth Amendment protection. Id.
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A. Eleventh Circuit Approach
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, facing an issue of first
impression, was asked to determine the place of CSLI in the scope
of the Fourth Amendment in United States v. Davis.105 In Davis,
the defendant was convicted for various armed robberies with evi-
dence including his CSLI, which the government obtained by com-
pelling its production from the cell phone carrier's business rec-
ords.106 The defendant argued that the compelled production of
these records constituted a Fourth Amendment search requiring
probable cause.107 The court held that the SCA order used to compel
production of the CSLI was not a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment, because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in a
third party's business records.108 The court found that since the
records were non-content under the SCA,109 the defendant had nei-
ther a property interest in the records, nor a subjective or objective
reasonable expectation of privacy in them.110
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant's argument to apply
Jones, which held that attaching a GPS tracking device was a phys-
ical intrusion requiring a search warrant.' The Eleventh Circuit
distinguished CSLI from real-time GPS tracking, finding CSLI to
be less precise in pinpointing location than GPS data.112 Analyzing
the concurring opinions in Jones, the Eleventh Circuit declined to
apply the mosaic theory approach as well. 1 1 3 The court found that
the concurring opinions "underscore[d] why this [c]ourt is bound by
[the third-party doctrine] ."114 Reading Justice Sotomayor's concur-
rence, the court found the questions it raised to be simply that:
questions.115 While acknowledging that Justice Sotomayor may
have hinted at the need to reevaluate the third-party doctrine in
the modern context, the court emphasized that she still ultimately
concurred in the physical trespass holding of the majority.116 As a
result, her subsequent questions or statements were not binding.117
105. See generally 785 F.3d 498, 500 (11th Cir. 2015).
106. Id. at 501.
107. Id. at 503.
108. Id. at 507 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)).
109. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
110. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015).
111. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).








The Eleventh Circuit strictly applied the third-party doctrine,
recognizing that even if obtaining CSLI constituted a search, it was
not unreasonable because there is no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in business records created and kept by a third party.1 18 The
court chose not to discard the third-party doctrine simply because
the records can reveal user location, even claiming that the records
at issue in Smith technically revealed location as well since the in-
formation was tied to a landline home phone.119
Finally, the court came back to the SCA as the ultimate guide,
emphasizing that the reasonable suspicion requirement prior to ob-
taining a court order for CSLI constitutes built-in statutory privacy
protections.120 The court determined that because CSLI is crucial
in investigations, the SCA was intended to build probable cause ra-
ther than require it.121 As a result, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately
concluded there was no Fourth Amendment search when the gov-
ernment obtained a defendant's CSLI under the SCA. 122
B. Sixth Circuit Approach
After the Eleventh Circuit decision in Davis, the Sixth Circuit
confronted the same issue in United States v. Carpenter, where the
defendant was convicted of robbery with CSLI evidence obtained
under the SCA. 12 3 Although reaching a similar result as the Elev-
enth Circuit in finding that acquiring CSLI was not a search under
the Fourth Amendment, the Sixth Circuit deviated slightly in its
reasoning.124 The court focused upon the general non-content na-
ture of CSLI in relation to traditional Fourth Amendment law, even
without the SCA distinction as such.125 Specifically, the court lik-
ened CSLI to address information found on the outside of mail en-
velopes, as opposed to the letters inside the envelopes.126 Authority
has long held that the information written on the outside of mail
envelopes is non-content, as it only relays routing details for busi-
ness purposes.127 Following this rationale, the court decided that
118. Id. at 517.
119. Id. at 511-12.
120. Id. at 517.
121. Id. at 518. Specifically, the court notes that SCA orders like the one here help to
build probable cause, "[d]eflect suspicion from the innocent, aid in the search for truth, and
judiciously allocate scarce investigative resources." Id.
122. Id. at 511.
123. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2016).
124. Id. at 890.
125. Id. at 887.




CSLI is used only for routine business purposes and thus does not
share the same level of protection afforded to the content of the com-
munications.128
Similar to the Eleventh Circuit, the Sixth Circuit rejected the de-
fendant's argument to expand the Jones holding to CSLI. 129 The
Sixth Circuit distinguished CSLI from the GPS tracking in Jones
on two points.130 First, the GPS intrusion in Jones was a physical
trespass, whereas the search here was into third party business rec-
ords.131 Second, the GPS tracking in Jones had the potential to re-
veal detailed information, which CSLI could not do.1 3 2 The court
would not extend the concept of the mosaic theory to CSLI, claiming
that CSLI could not provide location information with the precision
that other forms of GPS tracking could.133
The Sixth Circuit relied primarily upon the third-party doctrine
and found it to be appropriate to address the issue of CSLI as well
as to distinguish Jones, which was a physical trespass by the gov-
ernment, not a compelled production of third party records.134 The
court emphasized the distinction between the government actions
in both cases.135 The CSLI obtained in Carpenter was from a third-
party's business records, so the defendant had a diminished expec-
tation of privacy with regards to those records.136 In contrast, the
information obtained in Jones was not first revealed to a third
party, but rather directly tracked by the government.137 As a result,
the expectation of privacy and the type of government intrusion in
the present case were fundamentally different from those in
Jones.138
The Sixth Circuit rationalized that collecting CSLI contained in
business records was squarely within the third-party doctrine, in
stark contrast to the warrantless attachment of a GPS device to an
128. Id. at 887.
129. Id. at 888.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 889.
132. Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring)).
133. Id.
134. Id. Using traditional trespass principles, the Court in Jones held that law enforce-
ment is required to obtain a warrant prior to attaching a GPS tracking device to a defendant's
vehicle for long-term location tracking. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
135. Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 888.
136. Id. at 889.
137. Id. at 888. Specifically, the court compared and contrasted the differences between
the type of government action. Id. For example, the court noted that while the government's
wiretap of a telephone conversation would invade a reasonable expectation of privacy, that
same conversation overheard on an airplane would not. Id.
138. Id. at 889.
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individual's car as in Jones.139 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit con-
cluded that procuring CSLI was not a search, CSLI is appropriately
protected by the SCA, and any reevaluation of how CSLI is obtained
by law enforcement should be done by the legislature.140
C. Fourth Circuit Approach
Under facts similar to Carpenter, the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals was the first circuit court to define the Fourth Amendment
protection given to CSLI in a vastly different way in its decision in
Graham L141 Although the Fourth Circuit did grant a rehearing en
banc and eventually aligned its position with the Eleventh and
Sixth Circuits, the rationale behind Graham Iprovides valuable in-
sight on the divide regarding how to treat CSLI. 14 2 In Graham, law
enforcement officers sought disclosure of CSLI under the SCA for
calls and text messages from two defendants convicted of robbery.143
The Fourth Circuit initially held that when law enforcement of-
ficers obtain historic CSLI, they conduct a search within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment.144 The court in Graham Ifound that
CSLI searches track movements and reveal personal details in
which cell phone users have a reasonable expectation of privacy.145
The court cited to the beeper cases, Karo and Knotts,146 to establish
the premise that "the Supreme Court has recognized an individual's
privacy interests in comprehensive accounts of her movements in
her location .. .particularly when such information is available only
through technological means not in use by the general public."147
The court was particularly concerned about the long-term tracking
device, the cell phone, being carried on the person, because it could
track the individual even while at the home, a place where Fourth
Amendment protection is at its strongest.148 As a result, the court
in Graham I declined the rationale of the other circuits, finding
139. Id.
140. Id. at 890.
141. Graham I, 796 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2015).
142. See generally Graham II, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016).
143. Graham I, 796 F.3d at 341.
144. Id. at 344-45.
145. Id. at 345.
146. In Karo, the Court found that a warrant was required when a location tracking
beeper tracked a defendant in his house. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984). On
the other hand, in Knotts, the Court found that there was no Fourth Amendment search
when a beeper tracked the defendant on public roads. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276,
285 (1983).
147. Graham I, 796 F.3d at 345.
148. Id. at 347; see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 714 (noting the established principle that "pri-




CSLI was fundamentally similar to other types of location tracking,
despite the presence of a third party.14 9
The court in Graham I addressed both the Jones holding as well
as the third-party doctrine while affording CSLI the greatest pro-
tection under the Fourth Amendment seen thus far by a court.15 0
While analyzing the majority and concurring opinions in Jones, the
Fourth Circuit found that the privacy interests implicated in Jones
were equal to, if not greater than, the privacy interests in CSLI. 15 1
Further, since the long-term location information comprehensively
reveals details of an individual's life, a search into CSLI invades a
reasonable expectation of privacy.1 52
While addressing the third-party doctrine, the Graham I court
focused primarily on voluntary conveyance of information as the de-
termining factor for assumption of risk.1 5 3 The court declined to
extend the third-party doctrine to cell phones, as "a cell phone user
does not 'convey' CSLI to her service provider at all," and thus does
not assume the risk that such information will be disclosed.1 5 4 Ad-
ditionally, the court did not extend the third-party doctrine, be-
cause it found that the doctrine should not be categorically applied
when there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in information
''generated and recorded by a third party through an accident of
technology."1 5 5  The Graham I court concluded that individuals
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI, implicating
Fourth Amendment protection.1 5 6 As a result, law enforcement of-
ficers in the Fourth Circuit would have to obtain a warrant based
on probable cause before collecting CSLI in the future.1 5 7
After a rehearing en banc, the Fourth Circuit joined the Eleventh
and Sixth Circuits, acknowledging that "[t]he Supreme Court may
in the future limit, or even eliminate, the third-party doctrine," or
"Congress may act to require a warrant for CSLI."1 5 8 However, un-
til that time, the Fourth Circuit determined it was bound by exist-
ing precedent, which required a finding that warrantless acquisi-
tion of CSLI did not violate the Fourth Amendment.1 5 9 The court
149. Graham I, 796 F.3d at 361.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 348.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 354.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 360.
156. Id. at 361.
157. Id.




in Graham H1 found that the defendant mischaracterized the gov-
ernmental activity by relying upon the beeper cases.160 The court
rejected the notion that the beeper cases stood for the proposition
that there is an individual expectation of privacy when location is
being tracked.161 Rather, the court drew upon the third-party doc-
trine and distinguished how this case involved government collec-
tion of third party records, not government tracking of individu-
als.1 6 2 Like the Sixth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit in Graham H1
found the nature of the government activity to be different in cases
of CSLI, because law enforcement was not actively tracking a de-
fendant, but rather obtaining third-party records.163
From there, the court in Graham H1 applied the third-party doc-
trine as set forth in Smith, finding CSLI to be analogous to the tel-
ephone numbers recorded by a pen register.164 According to the
court, CSLI was voluntarily conveyed and "unquestionably 'ex-
posed,"' thus the defendants assumed the risk that the information
would be disclosed to the government.165 As a result, the court held
that government acquisition of CSLI did not require a warrant
based on probable cause as per the Fourth Amendment.166 The
Fourth Circuit acknowledged that to hold otherwise, as the court
did in Graham I, would be to conflict with binding Supreme Court
precedent and the majority of other federal circuits.167
V. ARGUMENT
Neither the third-party doctrine nor the mosaic theory is an ap-
propriate solution to protect CSLI under the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court should continue its trend of recognizing the
unique role of new technology with regards to the Fourth Amend-
ment and overturn the third-party doctrine as applied in such cir-
cumstances. However, the Supreme Court alone cannot be the only
authority to define the place of CSLI in the Fourth Amendment
scheme. Therefore, the legislature should take up the issue of CSLI
160. Id. at 426.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.; see also In re Application Fifth Circuit, 724 F.3d at 610 (emphasizing the im-
portance of determining "who is recording an individual's information initially," as that de-
termines the individual's reasonable expectation f privacy) (emphasis in original).
164. Graham II, 824 F.3d at 427. Specifically, the court noted that the CSLI that the
carrier recorded "was necessary to route Defendants' cell phone calls and texts, just as the




167. Id. at 429.
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and enact a statute that protects this important information under
the Fourth Amendment by requiring a warrant based on probable
cause before it is collected.
A. Insufficiency of the Third-Party Doctrine and Mosaic Theory
The third-party doctrine is grounded in reasonable principles for
the era in which it was created, but it does not translate into an age
of technology.168 As such, the doctrine is insufficient to protect
CSLI. 1 6 9 The third-party doctrine is premised on the idea that in-
formation is voluntarily conveyed and courts allowing warrantless
searches of CSLI have justified holdings based on this concept.170
However, by its very essence, cell phone technology challenges that
foundational aspect of the third-party doctrine.171 CSLI is not vol-
untarily conveyed, but rather is automatically collected by service
providers and not revealed to users.172 The user does not consent o
or participate in the collection or transmission of the location at all
besides simply using a personal piece of technology.173 In fact,
168. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). So-
tomayor stated that the third-party doctrine premise is "ill suited to the digital age," and
provided various examples of information disclosed to third parties, including URLs, emails,
and phone numbers, which users would not wish to be disclosed without a warrant. Id. As a
result, Sotomayor concluded that she "would not assume that all information voluntarily dis-
closed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled
to Fourth Amendment protection." Id.
169. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). Specifically, the court for the East-
ern District of New York stated:
The fiction that the vast majority of the American population consents to warrantless
government access to the records of a significant share of their movements by "choos-
ing" to carry a cell phone must be rejected. In light of drastic developments in technol-
ogy, the Fourth Amendment doctrine must evolve to preserve cell-phone user's [sic.]
reasonable expectation of privacy in cumulative cell-site-location records.
Id.
170. Compare United Statesv. Wheeler, 169 F. Supp. 3d 896, 910 (E.D. Wis. 2016) (reject-
ing the Graham Icourt's conclusion that a cell phone user does not voluntarily convey CSLI
under the third-party doctrine), with United States v. Rogers, 71 F. Supp. 3d 745, 750 (N.D.
Ill. 2014) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI voluntarily conveyed to the
cell phone carrier).
171. Graham I, 796 F.3d 332, 354 (4th Cir. 2015). Specifically, the court in Graham I
noted that a "cell phone user does not 'convey' CSLI to her service provider at all - voluntarily
or otherwise." Id.; see also In re Application Fifth Circuit, 724 F.3d 600, 612 (5th Cir. 2013)
(summarizing the American Civil Liberties Union argument that a cell phone user receives
no indication that he will be located when making a call, thus "[a] user cannot convey some-
thing which he does not know he has").
172. Graham I, 796 F.3d at 354; see also Com. v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 862 (Mass.
2014) (distinguishing CSLI from the phone numbers in Smith, because "no cellular telephone
user . . .voluntarily conveys CSLI to his or her cellular service provider.").
173. Graham I, 796 F.3d at 354-55.
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"CSLI is purely a function and product of cellular telephone tech-
nology, created by the provider's system network."1 74 As a result,
CSLI is a natural consequence of cell phone technology, and law
enforcement officers seek it not for any information voluntarily
given by the user, but rather for the information's "by-product" -
the CSLI. 175 Even conceding that the cell phone provider owns this
information, CSLI is vastly different from the types of information
the third-party doctrine originally anticipated.17 6 Given this, it can-
not be said that cell phone users assume the risk of CSLI disclosure
when they have not "actively" chosen to disclose it."177
The basic third-party doctrine premise of voluntary conveyance
is not the only issue preventing the doctrine from transitioning into
the technological era. As noted by Justice Marshall in his Smith
dissent, lack of alternatives makes the third-party doctrine partic-
ularly difficult to justify.1 78 In Smith, Marshall was concerned with
the lack of alternative to the traditional landline home phone.179
Cell phones are arguably even more ubiquitous than home
phones,180 thus escalating the concern originally presented by Jus-
tice Marshall. In fact, cell phones have been acknowledged to be "so
pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential
means or necessary instruments of self-expression."181 The lack of
meaningful alternatives to a cell phone in the modern age makes it
difficult to claim users could avoid unwanted effects of the third-
party doctrine, like CSLI disclosure, simply by not owning a cell
phone.182
174. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d at 862.
175. Id. at 863.
176. Id.
177. Graham I, 796 F.3d at 355.
178. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
179. Id.
180. Graham I, 796 F.3d at 355. In declining to accept the voluntary conveyance justifi-
cation, the Graham I court stated:
We cannot accept the proposition that cell phone users volunteer to convey their loca-
tion information simply by choosing to activate and use their cell phones and to carry
the device on their person. Cell phone use is not only ubiquitous in our society today,
but at least for an increasing portion of our society, it has become essential to full
cultural and economic participation.
Id.
181. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010).
182. See Richard Brust, Crashing the Third Party: Experts Weigh How Far the Govern-
ment Can go in Reading Your Email, A.B.A. (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/mag-
azine/article/crashing-the-third-party-experts-weigh _h owfarthe-government-can-go
(discussing how there is "no practical alternative to use of [a] third party" when conveying
information technologically, meaning the alternative is not to communicate at all); see also
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info.,
809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (acknowledging that cell phones have replaced
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Additionally, the argument that CSLI falls outside of Fourth
Amendment principles simply because the government does not ac-
tively collect the information is without merit.183 Knotts and Karo
implicate the same privacy interests as CSLI, despite their specific
context of law enforcement officers actively tracking rather than ob-
taining third party records.184 Simply because CSLI is technically
collected first by a third-party rather than the government should
not preclude the information from the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement.185 The mechanism or party doing the collecting does
not make the information revealed any less personal or any less
worthy of protection.186
Courts that have looked to the beeper cases, Knotts and Karo,
when analyzing CSLI have done so not only for the third party ver-
sus government distinction, but also for the proposition that CSLI
can track individuals in constitutionally protected places.187 By this
logic, CSLI should fall within the Fourth Amendment's protection,
because cumulative and extended location tracking "implicates a
privacy interest on the part of the individual who is the target."188
While GPS trackers such as the one used in Jones, or beepers in
Knotts and Karo, are obviously distinct from CSLI in functionality,
they both center around the same interest: an individual's reason-
able expectation of privacy in his movements.189 Since CSLI pro-
tects the same privacy interests that are at stake with GPS track-
ers, this information should not be precluded from Fourth Amend-
ment protection solely because the government goes through an in-
termediary to obtain it.190
public telephones like those in Katz, but the Fourth Amendment has "not developed to em-
brace the vital role the cell phone has come to play").
183. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
184. See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 346 (likening the search in Karo to CSLI, as both searches
"allow the government to place an individual and her personal property ... at the person's
home and other private locations").
185. See Brief for the Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent, In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Pro-
vider of Elec. Commc'ns Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585 (W.D. Pa.
2008), vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
186. See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 360 (remarking that the generation of CSLI is an incident
of the technology, and the third-party doctrine is not intended "to diminish Fourth Amend-
ment protections where new technology provides new means for acquiring private infor-
mation").
187. Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 864 (Mass. 2014).
188. Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring).
189. Id. at 865. But see United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 515 (6th Cir. 2015) (distin-
guishing between real-time GPS tracking and CSLI by claiming CSLI is not as precise as
GPS tracking nor does it warrant the same reasonable expectation ofprivacy).
190. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-
Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
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The mosaic theory comes closer to accommodating the Fourth
Amendment needs of evolving technology, but is still an insufficient
solution to protect CSLI. The general concept of the mosaic theory,
which encourages analyzing the government activity on the whole,
moves Fourth Amendment jurisprudence into the twenty-first cen-
tury by acknowledging that metadata poses challenges to existing
rules of law.191 However, implementation of the mosaic theory
would require courts to define an entirely new doctrine of Fourth
Amendment law, an arduous task involving novel questions.192
The primary concern with the mosaic theory is that it is stand-
ardless, which is a problem not easily cured.193 As a result, the mo-
saic theory is not a viable option for the Supreme Court o turn to
in the upcoming Carpenter case.194 Courts implementing the theory
would be required to determine at what stages of surveillance it ap-
plies.195 For example, whether the mosaic theory applies only to
collection of data, analysis of the data following collection, or
both.196 Along the same lines, courts would be forced to define
clearer standards with regards to which surveillance methods the
theory applies.197  This task would also involve determining
whether different methods should be grouped together as part of
one mosaic.198 For example, if law enforcement used GPS tracking,
CSLI, and a surveillance camera to track an individual, courts
would need to determine if all of those methods should be grouped
together or looked at separately in deciding if there is a Fourth
Amendment search under the mosaic theory.199 Additionally, the
mosaic theory complicates the concept of reasonableness that has
become so foundational to the understanding of the Fourth Amend-
ment.200 Courts using the mosaic theory would need to determine
when such searches are reasonable, as well as when they require
191. W. Scott Kim, The Fourth Amendment Implications on the Real-Time Tracking of
Cell Phones Through the Use of "Stingrays," 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
995, 1025 (2016).
192. Kerr, supra note 18, at 329.
193. Id. at 330.
194. See Orin Kerr, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear 'Carpenter v. United States,' the Fourth
Amendment Historical Cell-Site Case, WASHINGTON POST (June 5, 2017), https://www. wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/05/supreme-court-agrees-to-hear-carp
enter-v-united-states-the-fourth-amendment-historical-cell-site-case/?utm ter =. 4259
dl1fe802.




199. Id. at 334. Other parts of this inquiry include whether the mosaic theory should
apply only to location surveillance, and whether different officers and investigations should
be considered as part of the mosaic grouping. Id.
200. Id. at 336.
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warrants based on probable cause or simply reasonable suspi-
cion.201
Last, courts would have to determine what remedies should exist
for searches found to be unconstitutional under the mosaic the-
ory.20 2 This question involves resolving who has standing, the ap-
plication of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, and whether the
exclusionary rule should be categorically applied.203 Overall, the
mosaic theory presents a better solution than the third-party doc-
trine, but it would be cumbersome for The Supreme Court to imple-
ment and may perhaps only lead to more questions than answers.204
Moreover, these issues underscore the importance that a solution
to CSLI gathering be a product of both legislation and case law.
B. The Solution: A Blend of the Judiciary and the Legislature
While it would be desirable for the Supreme Court to address the
CSLI issue in its entirety, the holding would be limited to the facts
and circumstances of Carpenter, and could leave open various ques-
tions for future litigation. For example, the Carpenter holding could
not cover all related cell phone location information that originates
from other sources such as cell site stimulators or GPS receivers
within the cell phone.205 Further, even in finally addressing CSLI
while deciding Carpenter, the judiciary cannot serve the law-mak-
ing function as efficiently and re-write the outdated aspects of the
SCA. The most effective way to accomplish securing Fourth
Amendment protection for CSLI and begin a trend of increasing pri-
vacy protection for all new technologies is only with action from
both the Supreme Court and Congress.
1. Overruling the Third-Party Doctrine in Carpenter
Although the Supreme Court cannot alone cure the entire CSLI
problem when deciding Carpenter, it should abandon use of the
third-party doctrine in technology cases, as the doctrine is unwork-
able in the modern context. To allow the third-party doctrine to
perpetuate and permeate the field of technological communications
201. Id.
202. Id. at 340.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 329.
205. See generally Jemal R. Brinson, Cell Site Stimulators: How Law Enforcement Can
Track You, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/plus/ct-
cellphone-tracking-devices-20160 129-htmlstory.html; Location Privacy, ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, https://epic.org/privacy/location/#tracking-methods (last
visited Sept. 23, 2017).
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would come at the expense of significant individual privacy
rights.206 Rather, the Supreme Court should take Carpenter as an
opportunity to reevaluate the third-party doctrine and limit its use
in the modern era.
On the questionable basis of voluntary conveyance, the third-
party doctrine relegates the vast quantity of information contained
in CSLI to the same status as records of phone numbers dialed from
a landline phone in the 1970s.20 7 This is a stretched comparison
that lacks applicability to CSLI, as CSLI provides significantly
more information than simply telephone numbers dialed.208 CSLI
is routinely generated as a result of the cell phone's core function,209
much like most technology today, and thus cannot be considered to
be voluntarily conveyed by users as required by the third-party doc-
trine.210 As discussed by the dissenting judges in Graham II, third-
party doctrine precedent appears to demonstrate that voluntary
conveyance requires both an individual's knowledge and action.2 11
However, it is quite likely that the majority of cell phone users are
unaware that they are conveying their location on a regular basis,
which greatly undercuts the knowledge aspect of voluntary convey-
ance.2 12 Even if users possess a vague understanding of the tech-
nology involved when a cell phone connects to the network, they do
not know through which tower the call is connecting, which again
weakens the knowledge component of the conveyance.213
Additionally, users do not actively transmit CSLI, but rather the
information is automatically generated as part of the cell phone's
technology.214 Since cell phone users do not actively transmit CSLI
nor possess the requisite knowledge of its transmission, CSLI is not
voluntarily conveyed.215 This crucial fact demonstrates not only
206. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(discussing the need to reevaluate the third-party doctrine in the "digital age").
207. Graham II, 824 F.3d 421, 436 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that intrinsic to the third-party
doctrine "is an assumption that the quantity of information an individual shares with a third
party does not affect whether that individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy").
208. Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.4d 846, 863 (Mass. 2014). The Massachusetts
Supreme Court noted that CSLI may reveal a "treasure trove of very detailed and extensive
information about the individual's 'comings and goings' in both public and private cases." Id.
209. Id. at 862.
210. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
211. Graham II, 824 F.3d at 443 (Wynn, J., dissenting). The knowledge requirement in-
volves the individual being aware she is "communicating particular information." Id. The
action requirement involves the defendant actively transmitting the information, such as
through dialing or speaking. Id.
212. Id. at 445 (citing In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of
Elec. Commc'ns Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010)).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 446.
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that CSLI cannot be reconciled with the third-party doctrine, but
also that new technologies on the whole are a poor fit with the doc-
trine. For example, the third-party doctrine has been invoked by
various circuit courts of appeals to diminish Fourth Amendment
protection for IP addresses, email addresses, and other information
that must be transmitted to a third party out of necessity for the
technology to operate.216
The third-party doctrine also lacks applicability to CSLI because
the reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone and location in-
formation is different than that for typical business records.217 Alt-
hough courts declining to extend Fourth Amendment protection to
CSLI argue that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
third party records,218 CSLI implicates more than simple business
records.219 Rather, when CSLI is obtained, cell phones essentially
function as tracking devices, providing significant amounts of per-
sonal information about an individual's movements.220 This occurs
regardless of if the CSLI is historical or real time, as the infor-
mation remains the same in either context.221 The movements
tracked include those in public as well as both constitutionally pro-
tected spaces and spaces where an individual maintains a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy.222 In fact, organizations in favor of pro-
tecting CSLI argue that the compilation of location data implicates
both First and Fourth Amendment protections, as the picture
painted by location data can reveal political associations, religious
affiliations, and other "expressive and associational activities."223
216. See, e.g., United States v. Caira, 833 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that under
the third-party doctrine, an email user had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP
address); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (relying on the third-
party doctrine to establish that internet users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in
email addresses).
217. State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 642 (N.J. 2013).
218. See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 507 (11th Cir. 2015) (applying the third-
party doctrine to hold there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI).
219. Earls, 70 A.3d at 642.
220. Id.
221. See Susan Freiwald, The Vanishing Distinction Between Real-time and Historical Lo-
cation Data, CONCURRING OPINIONS (July 17, 2012), https://concurringopinions.com/ar-
chives/ 20 12/07/the-vanishing-distinction-between-real-time-and-historical-location-
data.html.
222. Earls, 70 A.3d at 642. Specifically, the defendant in Earls was in a motel room while
he was being tracked. Id. As a result, law enforcement officers were able to track the defend-
ant in private spaces without a warrant, as they did not know in advance where the defend-
ant would be going. Id.
223. See Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Pe-
titioner, United States v. Carpenter, 85 U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S. June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402).
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This pervasive nature of cell phones and the vast quantity of in-
formation contained in CSLI undercuts not only the voluntary con-
veyance argument, but also stands for the proposition that reason-
able expectations of privacy have changed in the technological
era.22 4 Because third parties are a necessary aspect of modern com-
munication, it is no longer feasible to claim that the vast quantity
of both content and non-content information transmitted to those
third parties is not reasonably expected to be private.2 2 5 By recon-
sidering the third-party doctrine, the Supreme Court must also re-
define the Katz analysis to accommodate the constant presence of
third parties in modern technology.
The inapplicability of third-party doctrine principles aside, the
Supreme Court itself has not invoked the doctrine in recent years
when presented with the opportunity to do so. This could be seen
in Jones for example, where the Court mentioned Smith in passing,
but did not engage in a discussion regarding its application to loca-
tion decisions, resorting instead to traditional property principles
for resolution.22 6 Additionally, the Court did not cite or give any
mention to the third-party doctrine in Riley, even while discussing
the fact that cell phone information may be stored on a third party
cloud. 2 2 7 The Supreme Court's lack of acknowledgment of its own
doctrine in recent cases of location tracking and cell phone privacy
further demonstrates that the third-party doctrine has lost applica-
bility in the modern context and should be overturned as a prece-
dent in such contexts.2 28
One court even compiled the most recent Supreme Court prece-
dent, including Riley, Jones, Knotts, and Karo to acknowledge that
these decisions together create a new set of Fourth Amendment
principles for cell phone tracking.229 Analyzing these decisions as a
composite, the district court for the Northern District of California
synthesized the following three principles:
(1) an individual's expectation of privacy is at its pinnacle when
government surveillance intrudes on the home; (2) long-term
electronic surveillance by the government implicates an indi-
vidual's expectation of privacy; and (3) location data generated
224. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
225. Id.; see also generally United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
226. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950.
227. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014).
228. Id.
229. In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d
1011, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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by cell phones, which are ubiquitous in this day and age, can
reveal a wealth of private information about an individual.2 30
Arguably, these three principles indicate how the Supreme Court
has moved away from the third-party doctrine and at least implic-
itly acknowledged some reasonable expectation of privacy in cell
phones.231 Further, although these principles were compiled with
regards to active government tracking with a beeper, they are
equally applicable to both historical and real-time CSLI. 2 3 2
This shift in precedent from the third-party doctrine can be ex-
plained by Professor Orin Kerr's "equilibrium adjustment" the-
ory.2 3 3 Under this theory, the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
precedent can be analyzed as part of a longstanding tradition of
Fourth Amendment adjustments to obtain equilibrium between in-
dividual privacy and government interests.234 As per the equilib-
rium adjustment approach, the Court adopts broad Fourth Amend-
ment principles when changing technology makes it difficult for law
enforcement to obtain evidence.235 Conversely, when technological
advancements make it easier for law enforcement to obtain evi-
dence, the Court alters the Fourth Amendment principles "to try to
restore the prior equilibrium," in favor of privacy.236 It is argued
that under this theory, the Court should wait until a technology has
reached a point of stability before intervening to restore privacy
protections.237
This approach further explains the Court's recent shift to protect
individual privacy in technology and why the Court should use Car-
penter as an opportunity to abandon the third-party doctrine,238 in
order to restore individual privacy, as part of its natural return to
more privacy protection.239 CSLI is not a new development and it
continues to serve as the foundation for basic cell phone technology,
even as phones are updated and changed to possess more location
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1031. Specifically, the court compared CSLI to the beepers used in Karo, as
both can reveal information that would be otherwise unavailable to law enforcement without
a warrant based on probable cause. Id.
233. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REV. 476, 481 (2011).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 480.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 482.
238. See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
239. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 476, 543 (2011).
134 Vol. 56
Cell Phone Tracking
functionality.240 In order for the Fourth Amendment to remain rel-
evant and applicable in the modern context, its interpretation must
be flexible and changing to accommodate evolving technology.2 4 1
The Sixth Circuit's heavy focus upon the third-party doctrine in
its analysis in Carpenter provides a perfect opportunity for the Su-
preme Court to reconsider the third-party doctrine.2 4 2 Indeed, the
Court's grant of certiorari on a CSLI case at this time when the cir-
cuit courts of appeal are in agreement raises the inference as to
whether the Court intends to do just that.2 4 3 This is further sup-
ported by the fact that the Court did not grant certiorari to Davis
or Graham II, both of which were also appealed.2 4 4 Rather, the
Court has decided to hear Carpenter alone, denying certiorari to
Davis and choosing not to act on the Graham II certiorari peti-
tion.245
Additionally, the current composition of the Supreme Court gives
some indication that the third-party doctrine may be reconsidered
and altered in the upcoming Carpenter case. Justice Sotomayor has
already voiced her concern regarding comprehensive location data
and the third-party doctrine's inapplicability in the "digital age."2 46
While no other justices joined Justice Sotomayor in Jones, Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, joined Justice Alito's separate con-
currence, which at least indicated a concern regarding the ease of
tracking location with the emergence of new technology.2 4 7 Further,
Chief Justice Roberts authored the landmark opinion Riley, which
recognized the need to protect the extensive personal data con-
tained in personal cell phones.2 4 8 Although newly appointed Justice
Gorsuch's opinions on the third-party doctrine are somewhat un-
known, he did acknowledge the uncertainty surrounding the doc-
240. See Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellant, United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 990 (6th Cir. 2016). In its brief, the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union also discusses the creation of newer, smaller cells, including micro-
cells, picocells, and femtocells, which "provide service to areas as small as ten meters." Id.
Thus, location in these newer cells can be tracked through CSLI even more precisely than
before. Id.
241. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-
Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
242. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 889 (6th Cir. 2016).
243. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
244. See Graham II, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Sept. 26,
2016) (No. 16-6308); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 84
U.S.L.W. 3081 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2015) (No. 15-146).
245. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W.
3567 (U.S. June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402).
246. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
247. Id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring).
248. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
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trine in a Tenth Circuit decision where he found email communica-
tions are protected by the Fourth Amendment.2 4 9 The Supreme
Court should continue its trend of increasing Fourth Amendment
protection for new technologies by using Carpenter to overrule the
third-party doctrine's application in CSLI and future cases impli-
cating third-parties in technology.
2. Congressional Action: Requiring Probable Cause
The Supreme Court is not and cannot be the only entity the public
must rely on to protect CSLI. 2 5 0 The SCA may have been appropri-
ate legislation at the time it was passed, but Congress surely did
not envision the sensitive information currently proliferated by new
technology when it created a lower cause standard for non-con-
tent.2 5 1 The legislative branch is better suited to determine the pub-
lic opinion on issues of this nature and balance governmental inter-
ests with privacy rights.2 5 2 Congress has at its disposal various re-
sources that allow it to strike the balance better than courts may.2 53
Through access to expert opinions and testimony in legislative
hearings, Congress can receive the information necessary to weigh
the interests of investigation techniques with constitutionally pro-
tected privacy rights.2 5 4
Additionally, when Congress speaks through a statutory enact-
ment, it creates clearer and more uniform standards upon which
courts can rely, thus eliminating the legal uncertainty that comes
with circuit splits.2 5 5 Unlike the Supreme Court, Congress can cre-
ate broad protections for both real-time and historical CSLI through
249. United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1304-05 (10th Cir. 2016).
250. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (finding "[i]n circumstances
involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legis-
lative"); Graham II, 824 F.3d 421, 436 (4th Cir. 2016) (stating "application of the third-party
doctrine does not render privacy an unavoidable casualty of technological progress - Con-
gress remains free to require greater privacy protection if it believes that desirable").
251. See Jennifer Lynch, Sixth Circuit Disregards Privacy in New Cell Site Location In-
formation Decision, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.eff.org
/fr/deeplinks/201 6/04/sixth-circuit-disregards-privacy-new-cell-site-location-information-de-
cisio n?page=6.
252. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
253. Graham II, 824 F.3d at 439 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). See also United States v.
Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 520 (6th Cir. 2015) (Pryor, J., concurring) (declining to extend Fourth
Amendment protection to CSLI because Congress "has the institutional competence to eval-
uate complex and evolving technologies.").




a statute rather than being limited to the circumstances surround-
ing one case.2 5 6 Overall, Congress is in the best position to deter-
mine how CSLI and indeed, all information proliferated by new
technology, can coexist with government searches.257
Perhaps the strongest argument for Fourth Amendment protec-
tion of CSLI is simply that CSLI is fundamentally different from
the old technologies the precedent intends to accommodate. Tele-
phone numbers revealed via a pen register or records of phone num-
bers dialed on a landline phone do not reveal nearly the volume of
personal detail as do CSLI records.258 Although CSLI does not dis-
close as precise of a location as a GPS may, CSLI can lead to logical
inferences that reveal not just location information, but also per-
sonal information about a user on the whole.2 5 9
Along with these basic concerns about locational information,
CSLI challenges the content and non-content distinction of the SCA
era in the age of metadata.260 In fact, while most courts discount
CSLI as non-content, "there is no meaningful Fourth Amendment
distinction between content and other forms of information, the dis-
closure of which to the government would be equally intrusive and
reveal information society values as private."261 The sheer breadth
of information that CSLI and similar bulk data collections can re-
veal about an individual challenge not only the third-party doctrine,
but also the non-content justification created by the SCA.2 6 2 All of
these concerns make it imperative for Congress to finally define
more clear lines in this area and increase Fourth Amendment pro-
tection for CSLI.
Congress should be motivated to take up this issue, as there is
significant research indicating many Americans are concerned
about their lack of privacy, both with the government and with com-
panies facilitating communications.263 In the aftermath of the
Snowden revelations, digital privacy has become more prevalent
256. See Susan Freiwald, supra note 221.
257. Id. As noted by Judge Wilkinson, Congress has the power to add "democratic legiti-
macy to a high stakes and highly controversial area," in the context of emerging communica-
tion technologies. Id.
258. See Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellant, United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 990 (6th Cir. 2016).
259. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'ns
Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 311 (3d Cir. 2010).
260. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-
Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
261. Id.
262. See id.
263. Public Perceptions ofPrivacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER, http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/11/PI_PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy
111214.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2017).
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and more frequently discussed in society.264 This concern directly
implicates CSLI, as studies show that the American public consid-
ers location data and general cell phone communications to be sen-
sitive information deserving privacy protection.2 6 5 These concerns
regarding privacy of information expand beyond simply a fear of
government,2 6 6 as many adults feel they have lost control over the
use of their personal information that is gathered by companies
too.2 6 7  Additionally, in light of the new Trump era, there is in-
creased fear that the balance between personal privacy and govern-
ment interests will become even more disparate.2 6 8 The American
public's belief that location information is highly sensitive com-
bined with the drastic increase in cell phone towers and usage that
creates highly precise location data makes this a ripe issue for leg-
islation.2 6 9 This information indicates that Congress should act on
behalf of its constituents to protect information that citizens rea-
sonably believe to be private.
As technologies continue to evolve, metadata consistently accu-
mulates,2 7 0 and political rhetoric implies individual privacy must be
traded off for security,2 7 1 Congress must be called upon to draw a
clear line that preserves Fourth Amendment protection for CSLI.
In fact, a bill was introduced in Congress in 2015 proposing greater
264. Id.
265. Id. In 2014, half of college educated adults reported believing their individual loca-
tion information gathered from a cell phone over a long period of time to be ''very sensitive'
information." Id. An additional 32% of college educated adults considered the information to
be "somewhat sensitive." Id.
266. Only 6% of adults surveyed by Pew Research Center were confident that government
agencies could keep their information private. Americans Attitudes About Privacy, Security
and Surveillance, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/up-
loads/sites/14/2015/05/Privacy-and-Security-Attitudes-5.19.15_FINAL.pdf (last visited Sept.
19, 2017). Only 6% of adults surveyed by Pew Research Center were confident that govern-
ment agencies could keep their information private. Id.
267. Public Perceptions ofPrivacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era, supra note 263.
Specifically, Pew Research Center found that 91% of adults surveyed were concerned about
their loss of privacy to third party companies. Id.
268. Spender Ackerman & Ewen MacAskill, Privacy Experts Fear Donald Trump Running
Global Surveillance Network, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 2016, 12:34 AM), https://www.
theguardian.com/world/20 16/nov/ 1/trump-surveillance-network-nsa-privacy.
269. See supra notes 253-257.
270. See Alexander Galicki, The End of Smith v. Maryland?: The NSA's Bulk Telephony
Metadata Program and the Fourth Amendment in the Cyber Age, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 375,
389 (2015) (acknowledging that advancements in technology have caused exposure of
metadata to telephone companies, Internet service providers, and other third parties).
271. See Lauren Cassani Davis, How Do Americans Weigh Privacy Versus National Secu-
rity?, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2016/02/heartland-monitor-privacy-security/459657/ (analyzing the sentiments among
Americans about he tradeoff between individual privacy and security).
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protection for location data.2 7 2 The Geolocation Privacy and Sur-
veillance ("GPS") Act would require law enforcement officers to ob-
tain a warrant pursuant to federal or state rules of criminal proce-
dure prior to obtaining geolocation information.273 The bill defines
geolocation information to include "any information that is not the
content of a communication, concerning the location of a wireless
communication device. "274 This proposed legislation contained enu-
merated exceptions to the warrant requirement in the cases of
emergency situations,275 and provided for civil remedies in the
event location information was obtained in violation of the stat-
ute.27 6
The proposed GPS Act would be a vital first step in protecting
CSLI and other location information that is currently not covered
by the SCA.2 7 7 Congress should acknowledge that the content and
non-content distinction of the past is blurred when metadata can
provide similar individual personal details.278 As part of this, Con-
gress should amend the Stored Communications Act to comply with
the Fourth Amendment without regard for the content and non-
content distinction. Under the revised act, Congress should require
a warrant based on probable cause be issued before any real-time
or historical CSLI is obtained.
VI. CONCLUSION
CSLI is a microcosm demonstrating one way in which the courts
and the law have not kept pace with current technologies.279 So
long as technologies continue to evolve and CSLI proliferates, the
third-party doctrine will become strained,280 and the mosaic theory
272. Robinson Meyer, Do Police Need a Warrant to See Where a Phone Is?, THE ATLANTIC
(Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/20 15/08/warrantless-cell-
phone-location-tracking/400775/.
273. Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance Act, H.R. 491, 114th Cong. § 2602 (2015).
274. Id. § 2601.
275. Id. § 2604. Some exceptions include "immediate danger of death or serious physical
injury," and "conspiratorial activities threatening the national security interest." Id.
276. Id. § 2605. Possible damages may include injunctive relief and punitive damages. Id.
Additionally, the statute provides that location information obtained in violation of the stat-
ute must be excluded as evidence. Id
277. See Wyden, Chaffetz Stand Up for Privacy with GPS Act, https://www.wyden. sen-
ate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-chaffetz-stand-up-for-privacy-with-gps-act (l st visited
Jan. 28, 2017) (stating that the proposed legislation would "settle the controversy" regarding
location information and "provide specific and clear guidelines to ensure this valuable and
effective technology is not abused").
278. Supra notes 260-261.
279. See generally Jennifer Valentino-Devries, How Technology is Testing the Fourth
Amendment, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept. 21, 2011, 10:32 PM) http://blogs.wsj.com/ dig-
its/2011/09/2 1/how-technology-is-testing-the-fourth-amendment/.
280. See supra notes 206-208.
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is not in any position to take its place.281 Both the judiciary and
legislature must come together to protect individual privacy and
move Fourth Amendment jurisprudence into the modern era by re-
quiring warrants based on probable cause prior to the acquisition
of reasonably private information.
281. See supra note 192.
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